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**Public policy discussions concerning nuclear energy production ignore the accidents of testing and waste that violate women’s bodies – The nuclear industry AS WELL AS the government have glossed over such violence by silencing the everyday, particular experiences of women.**

**Culley & Angelique in 03**

Culley andAngelique2003- Culley is a PhD Community Psychologist at University of Missouri – Kansas. Angelique PhD Psychologist and Professor of Community Psychology and Social Change at Penn State. *Women’s Gendered Experiences as Long-term Three Mile Island Activists. Gender and Society,* Vol. 17, No. 3 (Jun., 2003), pp. 445-461.

Two of the women interviewed were pregnant at the time of the accident. Each described feelings of violation and anger. Furthermore, most of the women described how their reports of area health effects have consistently been minimized, diluted, and/or blatantly ignored by the "experts" to this day. To a great extent, women's experiences as TMI activists parallel feminists' observations in other social movements that consciousness **transformation often begins with the "everyday" and "particular**" (Ferree 1983; Frye 1983; Gurin 1985; Jaggar 1983; Smith 1987). These specific daily events, like mothers' recognition that something is wrong, are rooted in experiences at home, with children, or with neighbors and set events into motion that ultimately led to personal transformations. Women's political participation grew out of their personal, everyday experiences. Personal transformations, based on everyday experiences and local knowledge, set the stage for developing a critical perspective and understanding power. Accordingly, a link to societal change was established through themes of assuming a political identity and a legacy of activism. Developing a Critical Perspective Four of the women indicated that they developed mistrust for the government and industry officials because of their activist efforts. They described their transition from patriot (believing that those in authority were in office to look out for the public's health and safety) to questioning skeptics (discovering a world where authority figures sometimes lied and appeared to be looking out for the industry). Both Linda B. and Paula K. recalled despising Vietnam War protesters for questioning the government. Paula noted, "Little did I know, years later I would be marching down the very same Pennsylvania avenue." Linda B. recalled thinking, "They [the government] took good care of us and didn't let things happen to us." Before her involvement, Debbie B. argued that she was "the most patriotic person you could ever meet in your entire life." She came to believe that "politicians are not there for the people." Joyce C. asserted that she developed a kind of callousness toward government and maintained that her "belief that government [took] care of us" was shattered. Understanding Power These same four women made references to a novel recognition of power asymmetries, one that was set up in favor of the industry and the government. Paula K. recalled, "They had the resources of attorneys and everything-it was David against Goliath. We'd have bake sales to try to help defray some of the costs of printing and things. We didn't stand a chance." Linda B. remembered discovering that "it has nothing to do with my inalienable rights..,. the way the government's run." Recognizing the costs to those with less power, she observed, "It's not like us peons down here have too much to say about what they're doin' [appointed NRC members] and yet we're the ones that experience the brunt of it when something goes wrong." Debbie B. realized, "You're at the mercy of who operates those plants, as far as the information that you get." She asserted, "They have so much control ... in the plans [and] in the outcome." Joyce C. shared her perceptions of meetings with NRC officials in Washington, D.C., that succinctly described differences of power: [We] sat at this huge mahogany table-it must've been 10 feet long, big enough for 20 [or] 25 people-with our Sunday best on and our little wannabe briefcases.... And here sits these men in Brooks Brothers suits, wing-tipped shoes and $500 briefcases on the table and I'm thinkin' to myself, why in the hell am I here? Over time, spreading knowledge among the women of power asymmetries helped to solidify their commitment to activism, while assumptions about their own abilities, their families' health, and the sociopolitical environment were shaped through the analysis of everyday experience.

**As a result of this systematic violence, women from all different races, classes and social locations are confronted with an opportunity for anti-waste activism. Yet, the questions of gender and nuclear toxic waste remain unexplored because there is privileged given to the authority of scientific, corporate and governmental voices. Their unwillingness to consider women’s everyday experiences creates an epistemological framework that not only covers up devastating health effects but also the inherent gender binaries in nuclear energy policy**

**Brown in 1995**

Phil Brown is a Professor at Brown University in Environmental Sociology and Health, Faith I. T. Ferguson, "*Making a Big Stink": Women's Work, Women's Relationships, and Toxic Waste Activism*. Gender and Society, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 145-172 Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/189869>. Accessed: 17/12/2012 18:12

Despite high levels of participation by women in toxic waste activism, gender and the fight against toxic hazards are rarely analyzed together in studies either on gender or on environmental issues. The absence of rigorous analysis of gender issues in toxic waste activism is particularly noticeable, since many scholars of toxic waste activism often note in passing that women predominate in this movement. Little work to date systematizes the overall characteristics of women toxic waste activists despite several case studies of the organization and activities of women in local toxic waste activist groups (Cable 1992; Garland 1988; Hamilton 1990; Krauss 1993) and many accounts of these groups in the popular media. Some work on toxic waste site organizing includes substantial discussion of women's roles (Brown and Mikkelsen 1990; Cable 1992; Edelstein, 1988; Levine 1982); moreover, scholarly work concerning gender and environment is focused mainly on ecofeminism and on economic development issues in the Third World and not on the consequences of class, gender, and race that characterize the experience of local toxic waste activist groups (Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992; Nelson 1990; Taylor 1989). This article analyzes women's toxic waste activism by examining case studies and attitude surveys and then tracing the sources of this activism through a "ways of knowing" perspective (Belenky et al. 1986). We look at how social movement theories can explain this activism. Social movement theory fits in two ways. At the level of cognitive psychology and self-concept, "frame analysis" complements the ways of knowing approach by showing people's personal transformations of frames of understanding. At the more macro level of social roles and social structures, the "political process" model makes a contribution by situating the toxic waste movement in a political-economic context. Elements of these social movement theories can be applied to a new global movement perspective In their toxic waste activism, these women challenge the political and eco- nomic power structure as well as the gendered boundaries of behavior in their communities and in their families. Most of these women activists are house- wives, typically from working-class or lower middle-class backgrounds, and most had never been political activists until they discovered the threat of toxic contamination in their communities. Although grassroots women activists have not necessarily seen themselves as descendants of prior movements, especially the women's movement (Cable 1992), they follow in the steps of generations of women activists who fought for occupational health and safety concerns throughout this century and who more recently have become involved in the women's health movement. Bale (1990) has noted some clear connections between various forms of "women's toxic experience." For example, early labor organizing around health issues often stemmed from women's workplaces and often involved specific women's health hazards. Women Strike for Peace, starting in 1961, was central to the movement against nuclear testing. Women's health activism concerning drug and contraceptive side effects, another set of technological hazards akin to toxic waste, is also a significant predecessor to current toxic waste struggles. Minority women active in toxic struggles do sometimes come out of a civil rights movement orientation (Bullard 1993; Taylor 1993). In their efforts to understand the hazards and to draw attention to the consequences of toxic exposure, these women activists come up against power and authority in scientific, corporate, and governmental unwillingness to consider their claims or address their concerns. As activist Cathy Hinds of Gray, Maine, said about her initial efforts to get her contaminated water supply tested, "It almost seemed as if they were angry with us-as if we had done something wrong, and how dare we inconvenience them this way. It was like talking to someone with no ears" (Garland 1988, 94). Authorities typically deny the need for action, largely on the basis that as women, particularly as housewives, activists cannot possibly know or understand the issues. Women activists have a different approach to experience and knowledge. We view their different, gendered experience as based on their roles as people who center their worldview more on relationships than on abstract rights and on their roles as the primary caretakers of the family. These roles lead women to be more aware of the real and potential health effects of toxic waste and to take a more skeptical view of traditional science. This article examines these women's transformation of self, with an emphasis on Field Belenky et al.'s (1986) concept of "ways of knowing." That perspective traces the ways that women come to know things, beginning with either silence or the acceptance of established authority, progressing to a trust in subjective knowledge, and then to a synthesis of external and subjective knowledge. We define toxic waste as the residue of toxic substances that are human-made or human-generated and known or suspected to be injurious to health. These occur[s] from mining, extraction, manufacturing, agricultural application, consumer uses, transportation, and disposal. Clearly, not all toxics are "wastes" but may be the result of intended uses, such as pesticide applications. In common parlance, many people use the term toxic waste to mean toxics in general. These include radioactive materials and chemicals known to be injurious to health that are emitted in air, ground, or water. Toxic waste sites include past deposition of such wastes as well as current and planned toxic waste facilities such as landfills, incinerators, and transport and disposal facilities.

**And, women in the anti-toxic waste movement have been historically excluded from public policy discussions because their narratives conflict and challenge the quote-unquote expert and official accounts of nuclear energy. These moments within public discourse reveal the rigid boundaries of scientific thought surrounding what constitutes legitimate knowledge production. Relying on the exclusion of other voices as a means to produce knowledge reaffirms the hierarchical nature of the public & private dichotomy. Instead, nuclear energy discussions must always remain open to making the personal political in order for some women to challenge systems of oppression.**

**Culley & Angelique in 03**

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Women are leading the antinuclear/anti-toxic waste movement in the United States and abroad. Women antitoxic activists have challenged and redefined the political power structure at a time when possibilities for progressive social change often seem dismal (Ackelsberg 2001). Those engaged in this process have described the experience as personally and politically transformative (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Cable 1992; Epstein 1993; Hill 1997; Krauss 1993a, 1993b; Pardo 1990). Although social movement involvement itself has been associated with participants' personal and political changes (Lawson and Barton 1980; McCourt 1977; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986; Neal and Phillips 1991; Thorne 1975), no literature to date has analyzed the content of perceived changes associated with long-term, local antinuclear activist efforts among women. National activist efforts tend to be more broadly focused and more ambiguous, by nature, than local efforts. Because national organizations are accountable to multiple constituencies, they are less likely to take on the most controversial topics (Lowry 1998). Instead, national activists must be prepared to make compromises to gain a seat at the negotiating table and to appease as many constituents as possible. Women's participation in broad-focused social movements (e.g., civil rights, general environmental, antiwar, etc.) has often reflected society's gendered division of labor (Lawson and Barton 1980; McCourt 1977; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986; Neal and Phillips 1991; Popielarz 1999; Thorne 1975). Generally, men occupy the formal leadership positions and devise strategies, while women perform organizational tasks, doing what Thorne (1975, 181) called the "shitwork." This perpetuates the commonly held stereotype that men perform activities of production, while women perform those of reproduction. In contrast, local environmental activists respond to specific concerns that are immediate and geographically close (Epstein 1993). These activists are more likely to focus on single issues (Krauss 1993a) that pose an immediate hazard to one's community. Because threat is imminent, compromises are often perceived as suspect. Local environmental activism is also less likely to be a white, middle-class movement than national organizations (Lowry 1998). At the local level, women are leading many grassroots efforts (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Cable 1992; Epstein 1993; Hill 1997; Krauss 1993a, 1993b; Levine 1982; Pardo 1990). Over time, women's participation evolves from "female-based" (e.g., organizational) tasks to "male-based" (e.g., leadership, public speaking) duties (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Cable 1992; Hill 1997; Lawson and Barton 1980; McCourt 1977; Pardo 1990). Cable (1992, 39) noted, "Protest involvement itself over time creates changes in the nature of participation itself." It is easy to imagine that involvement with issues that may pose immediate threats can have a powerful effect on activists themselves. Antinuclear and anti-toxic waste activism is couched in an understanding of technology and science. Women involved in antitoxic activism encounter barriers, particularly the socially constructed and deeply embedded beliefs about women and science that are consistent with feminists' conceptions of the hierarchical nature of the personal/private ("female realm") and the public/political ("male realm") (Ferree 1983; Frye 1983; Gurin 1985; Jaggar 1983; Smith 1987). Science ("rational/masculine") has typically rejected women's "ways of knowing" in antitoxic efforts (e.g., "informal," "experience based," "housewife surveys") as unscientific, unobjective, and irrational (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Krauss 1993a). Gender, it appears, plays a substantial role in undermining women's antinuclear activist efforts. Nonetheless, women involved in antitoxic activism are often prompted to act on threats posed by specific hazardous waste sites to the health, well-being, and survival of their families and communities. The literature suggests that women's activism in these cases is influenced by identification with "traditional" roles such as mother and/or housewife (Ackelsberg 2001; Brown and Ferguson 1995; Cable 1992; Gibbs 1982; Hill 1997; Krauss 1993a, 1993b; Pardo 1990). In this way, gen- der acts as a motivator for antinuclear/anti-toxic waste activism. In local social movements in particular, knowledge of power asymmetries is often a result of women's activism, rather than a priori. The "everyday" and the "particular" (e.g., mothers' recognition that something is wrong, rooted in experiences at home, with children, or neighbors) often contradict "expert" or "official" accounts (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Cable 1992; Gibbs 1982; Hill 1997; Krauss 1993a, 1993b; Pardo 1990). Thus, many women have had to prepare to debate with the "experts" to make their case by gaining knowledge in areas of toxicology, nuclear engineering, biology, and research methods (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Couch and Kroll-Smith 1997). This has changed dramatically the relationship between local residents, the "experts," and the meaning of "expert" knowledge. As such, women's antitoxic activism has led to a redefinition of gender equity issues on both personal and political levels (Cable 1992; Gibbs 1982; Hill 1997; Krauss 1993a, 1993b; Pardo 1990) To briefly summarize, local activists' efforts are focused on issues that are highly personal and that they perceive have negative consequences for themselves and their communities. In antitoxic local activism, threats to one's self and loved ones are considered immediate and potentially deadly. Women sense that something is wrong (e.g., awareness of children's, family members', or neighbors' symptoms/ illness) and "insist on its validity as knowledge" (Brown and Ferguson 1995, 151). According to past research (Krauss 1993b; Pardo 1990), gender acts as both a barrier and a facilitator to activism for women in local antitoxic movements. However, past researchers have not examined the effects of gender on long-term activism. In this study, we explore the extent to which gender is perceived as a barrier and/or facilitator over two decades of activism. Discussions of long-term transformative effects of women's activism, particularly in localized toxic waste movements, are largely absent from the empirical literature (Brown and Ferguson 1995; Cable 1992). Unlike Walsh's (1988) early investigation of community mobilization, this study focuses on the gendered experiences and changes associated with two decades of ongoing local antinuclear/ anti-toxic waste activism. Through a qualitative study, we extend Krauss's (1993b) and Pardo's (1990) earlier work on the importance of the "everyday" and the "particular" in women's activist efforts. For local women activists, especially antitoxic activists, the "personal" is an important precursor for political action. While both Krauss and Pardo described the importance of everyday experiences for women activists, we reveal some of the specific links between women's personal and political transformations over decades of activism. Women involved in two decades of Three Mile Island (TMI) activism provide a unique opportunity to explore questions of perceived transformation associated with long-term antitoxic activism. A brief summary of the TMI accident, its impact on residents, and subsequent community mobilization follows to place our research in context.

**The affirmative positions their gyno-centric criticism of male-dominated science within a discussion of Anti-Toxic activism. Such a move reflects on questions of gender and scientific objectivity as well as women’s entrance into the public, political sphere. Case studies of women’s toxic waste activism reveal how women’s work and perceptions can be rooted in the concrete and everyday experience. Our argument is not that women are inherent more nurturing and emotive, rather that gendered experiences, especially encounters with scientific expertise, may shape activists’ beliefs in their own knowledge as authoritative.**

**Brown, 1995**

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This challenge is made using objectivity as the standard against which lay work is judged, and objectivity debates are central to the gender-and-science question. We view this phenomenon in light of an awareness that science is historically, culturally, and structurally shaped very strongly by embedded beliefs about gender and women's role in science as well as about lay forms of knowledge and the value of subjective everyday experience. The women toxic waste activists' struggle not only is about the material conditions that have led to their exposure, but is centrally about the uses of knowledge and the validity of claims to recognition and authority as knowers. The leaders of toxic waste groups are often women. This is commonly reported by national toxics organizations, in many case studies, and in the personal observations of scholars in this area. EHN, a national group that works with several hundred local organizations, estimates that 70 percent of activists in local and statewide groups are women, in comparison to 30 percent in national groups (Price-King 1994). In Krauss's (1994) extensive interviews with toxic waste activists in various parts of the country, the majority were women. Raw percentages of women members of toxic waste activist groups may, however, underestimate actual activism. In Cable's study of Yellow Creek, Kentucky, women made up half the members, but mainly because most members were married couples. Since women carried out most of the work in that group, the 50 percent figure undercounts women's involvement. Cable (1994) believes that this phenomenon is typical in toxic waste organizations. The only evidence from a national sample comes from Freudenberg's (1984) survey of organizations involved in environmental health issues. Freudenberg drew a sample of 242 groups using inquiries to environmental, public interest, consumer, health, and citizen action groups and from reviews of three national newspapers and various environmental publications over a three-year period. Usable responses came from 110 organizations. Although Freudenberg did not ask the gender of group leaders, he did ask the occupation. The most common occupation for the leaders of these groups was homemaker (41 percent), which is typically a response given by women. We can assume that even if only 17 percent of those listing other occupations were women, women clearly make up a majority. Most likely, more than 17 percent of those listing other occupations are women, making it likely that women are a majority. Case studies of women toxic waste activists support Sara Ruddick's assertion that women's work and perceptions tend to be rooted, at least initially, in the concrete and the everyday. Bale suggests that the upsurge in environmental action in the 1970s, and toxic waste activism in particular, was for women "an attempt [by women] to attach meaning to their fears and pain" (1990, 421) resulting from exposure to toxic waste. Among toxic waste activists, this assertion is reflected in the following quote from a local activist: 'The real issues came down to the human level. What we have seen in this community is kids die. When that happens, go for it" (Brown and Masterson-Allen 1994, 276). The traits and experiences of women who become toxic waste activists are not theirs simply because they are women who live in proximity to toxic waste hazards; rather, they conceptualize their action, both for themselves and a wider public, out of the meaning of womanhood, and especially of motherhood, in our culture. Such a broader social meaning of gender is clearly articulated by Fernandez Kelly as somewhat more complex than a simple social distinction between the sexes: Gender refers to meshed economic, political and ideological relations .... Gender circumscribes the alternatives of individuals of different sexes in the area of paid employment.... Gender is political as it contributes to differential distributions of power and access to vital resources on the basis of sexual difference. Gender implicates the shaping of consciousness and the elaboration of collective discourses which alternatively explain, legitimate, or question the position of men and women as members of families and as workers. (1990, 184) Despite the centrality of gender and emphasis on mothering in our analysis, as Morgen points out, much of the literature on women and community organizing tends to begin with the presupposition that a sexual division of labor determines that women activists work primarily out of their conventional private-sphere responsibilities (i.e., family service and motherhood) and that this presupposition limits our understanding of women's activist work within the community. She notes, however, that "women's community-based political activism is a conscious and collective way of expressing and acting on their interests as women, as wives and mothers, as members of neighborhoods and communities, and as members of particular race, ethnic and class groups" (1988, 111). **Rather than making an essentialist argument about women's nature** as the determinant of this particular kind of activism, it is in this sense of **distinctive identity rooted in gendered experience, especially the encounter with scientific expertise and the activists' growing belief in their own knowledge as authoritative, that we approach the work of women toxic waste activists.** While women often show a higher level of environmental concern in attitudinal surveys, they also report lower rates of activism in the broader environmental movement (Blocker and Eckberg 1989; Mohai 1992; Portney 1991); yet, they are heavily represented in both the leadership and the membership of local toxic waste activist organizations. Comparison of attitudinal studies to case studies suggests that there are important differences between environmental activists who work on a national or global scale-especially those affiliated with the older, more established environmental and conservation organizations such as the Sierra Club or the Appalachian Mountain Club-and members of smaller groups who are fighting the presence of a specific local hazard and its consequences (Dunlap and Mertig 1992; Freudenberg and Steinsapir 1992). Toxic waste activists differ from environmental activists in that the former include more women, more people of color, older people, and people with less education (Hamilton 1990).

**Anti-Toxic waste activism exposes how some women use their particular experiences as a means to make sense of the world around them. Yet, Science, public policy and our culture at large has taken for granted the association of science and objectivity with masculine thought. As a result, other ways of knowing are trivialized as subjective and anti-scientific.**

**Brown, 1995**

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When women who define themselves primarily as housewives become involved in activism and work against local toxic waste hazards, they must find the resources to organize their communities, challenge local political systems, and hold corporate interests accountable. They find or develop many of these re- sources within themselves as they struggle and succeed in learning about science (e.g., epidemiology, hydrogeology, medicine, engineering), about politics and influencing public opinion, and about community organizing. These women also learn to cultivate external resources: they gain mentors in both scientific and political processes and become skilled in media relations. The women activists transform their everyday experiences, most typically their own and their neighbors' children's illness, into knowledge that they can use in the struggle against toxic waste, and they insist on its validity as knowledge. Such validity is contested by scientific experts and professionals, whose cultural beliefs about women and science lead them to refuse to accept the women activists' claims about the consequences of toxic exposure. Women toxic waste activists encounter deeply held beliefs about women and science on many levels. In light of this, it is critical to understand that science itself, our perceptions of it, how and where and by whom it gets done, and what kinds of problems get selected for study all are highly gendered social constructions (Harding 1986; Merchant 1980). The prevalence of Baconian metaphors in our culture's beliefs about science-female nature, male science-complicate responses to women's attempts to do science or to use it in pursuit of other goals. This association has a profound impact especially on nonexpert women, trying to use science to achieve social justice. As Fox Keller (1986) suggests, **our culture takes for granted the association of science and objective rational thought with masculinity and masculine ways of thinking**. She notes that scientific thought is commonly held to be a masculine quality, although objectivity itself is held by definition to be gender neutral. For Fox Keller, the development of objectivity is related to the psychological development of a capacity to distinguish the self from others. While this differentiation has certain positive features, it also removes people from their relational capacities. For us, it is precisely those relational capacities that are manifested in women's toxic waste activism, since the activists' claims arise from their experiences as people in relationships. Popular epidemiology is the method of choice for women facing toxic hazards. Women are generally denied access to scientific information, and their attempts at gaining access are trivialized as subjective and antiscientific. They therefore turn to approaches they develop themselves, such as informal health surveys and "lay mapping" of disease clusters. In some situations where sympathetic professionals are available and where the data are sufficient, activists collaborate with professionals in rigorous health surveys. A good example of women practicing this approach is the annual conference of EHN. Leaders and members of local toxic groups spend several days sharing their experience in investigation and action with other activists, physicians, epidemiologists, social scientists, and lawyers. These lay epidemiologists share health questionnaires, methods of data gathering and analysis, and other scientific issues. EHN acts as a national clearinghouse to assist local groups, but not to turn them into organizational branches. EHN staff work to develop alternatives to long and costly epidemiology studies. For example, they are correlating disease clusters with existing, accessible EPA data on toxic releases at the zip code level. While women often take the lead in organizing toxic protests, there are countless cases in which organizing does not occur. People often have no experience in any form of organizing and are unable to locate assistance from those who do. If the early lay detectives do not have the right connections, subsequent organizing may be unlikely. This would involve connections to national groups, if citizens needed help in building an organization; legal connections, if litigation were considered; state and federal agencies, if health studies were considered; and local, state, and federal legislators, if political action were considered. Sometimes people may have heard of toxic sites for which it took more than a decade to reach firm research conclusions, litigation, or remediation, and they fear embarking on such a long and arduous task. It is also common that communities develop disputes over the definition of toxic hazards, and alternative organizations vie for definition of the situation, hence diminishing action (Kroll- Smith and Couch 1990). Boosterism by powerful local elites in support of polluting companies may prevent action. Similar problems are seen in severely economically depressed rural communities that support toxic waste dumps. Sometimes a few people develop a good cluster analysis, yet still are unable to generate enthusiasm from others. An interesting example is in Leominster, Massachusetts, the location of a childhood autism cluster where the disease occurs at four times the expected rate. Several factors combine to make this site remain basically unorganized, with one family carrying on the entire burden. First, the city government supports the case, rather than the typical governmental resistance. Second, there has been a lot of out-migration of afflicted families. Third, there is likely a stigma of autism, based on a long history of blaming parents, especially mothers, for causing the disease. A clearer understanding of what causes some communities to develop activism and others to fail will require a detailed comparative study of many groups and members.

**And, this androcentric approach to science creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which communities of difference cannot survive. It is not that science or technology is bad, rather that patriarchal values have infiltrated these venues as a means to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill. The only logical outcome is ecological and nuclear catastrophe.**

**Nhanenge 7**

(Jytte, Masters @ U South Africa, Accepted Thesis Paper for Development Studies, “ECOFEMINSM: TOWARDS INTEGRATING THE CONCERNS OF WOMEN, POOR PEOPLE AND NATURE INTO DEVELOPMENT, uir.unisa.ac.za/bitstream/10500/570/1/dissertation.pdf)

The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to man's inherent nature. Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some women and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality. Likewise, if **the scientific "truth**" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. This creates a **self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature** and community simply **cannot survive**. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible. This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to patriarchal values infiltrated in science the type of technology developed is meant to **dominate, oppress, exploit and kill**. One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. Thus **any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation**. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life. Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and in many other parts of the world. Patriarchal power has brought us acid rain, global warming, military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering. We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. **The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust**.

#### Thus, Erica and I will advocate the removal of the restrictions on the feminine experiences of the anti-toxic waste movement that prevents them from being acknowledged and included within public policy discussions concerning nuclear energy.

**The affirmative is a prior question to any policy discussion on nuclear energy production – women’s consciousness of the toxic experience reveal new methods of knowing the world. Women’s “Ways of Knowing” is a framework that advocates for subjective experience rather than perceived rational objectivity. Our argument is not that scientific thought is bad, but rather science has hegemonically defined itself as objective and neutral while systematically excluding the private, familial, and emotional. Women’s anti-toxic waste movements reveal not only the exclusion of feminine voices but also how those voices use their everyday ways of knowing to create ethics of responsibility and connections with others.**

**Brown, 1995**

Brown is a Professor at Brown University in Environmental Sociology and Health, Faith I. T. Ferguson, "*Making a Big Stink": Women's Work, Women's Relationships, and Toxic Waste Activism*. Gender and Society, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Apr., 1995), pp. 145-172 Sage Publications, Inc. Stable URL: <http://www.jstor.org/stable/189869>. Accessed: 17/12/2012 18:12

Ways of Knowing To understand what Bale terms the "evolution of women's consciousness of the toxic experience" (1990, 431), we have adapted the model developed in Women ' Ways of Knowing (Belenky et al. 1986) as a framework for analyzing women toxic waste activists' epistemological development. Through transformations in their ways of knowing, women toxic waste activists come to terms both with the nature of the toxic contamination and with denial or evasion by public officials and industry. Women tend to take up the side of "cultural rationality" in opposition to "technical rationality." That is, they are centrally concerned with individual suffering, impaired relationships, ordinary daily experience, and direct perception of health effects. Just as in the larger case of popular epidemiology, approaching a problem from subjective experience rather than from a stance of perceived rational objectivity (i.e., conventional science) gives the activists' claims greater legitimacy in their own eyes. Local toxic waste activists typically describe the discovery of the truth about their communities' contamination as a developmental process. Their convictions about their government, their communities, and their own abilities follow a characteristic series of changes. Their self-development in understanding and using knowledge of science in defense of their children and communities conforms in many key ways to feminist relational psychology's descriptions of women's ways of knowing. Among women toxic waste activists, ways of knowing strongly affect the capacity for effective action. Activists' knowledge evolves from an initial trust in larger institutions-assumptions that government and businesses know and do what is morally right-to the discovery in their own neighborhoods of, for example, common incidence of rare childhood illness, to the ability to act on these discoveries. The process of coming to understand themselves as knowers is an important means by which women toxic waste activists empower themselves to act as forces for change in their communities. This perception of knowledge and its uses, and also of activists basing their claims in subjective experience, is associated with a type of moral and psycho- logical development that involves an orientation to an ethic of specific care rather than abstract rights (Gilligan 1982). Toxic waste activists argue that the quantitative risk assessment approach ignores personal and community experience in favor of global calculations of financial accounting, potential psychological response, and, most importantly, probability of hazards at toxic sites. The "rights" of corporations are thus placed on an (allegedly) objective plane, as contrasted with the subjective plane of local response. The conflict between these two is seen clearly in Love Canal, New York, where Hooker Chemical Company gave land to the town for a school with the proviso that the company would never be liable for chemical injuries. While Hooker relied on a legal document to protect itself from a lawsuit, Lois Gibbs's efforts on behalf of her own family and her community to solve the problem for everyone were based on a more personal notion of responsibility (Levine 1982). There is a tension between objective (public, governmental, corporate, rational, male) and subjective (private, familial, emotional, female) that resembles in many ways the opposition between women toxic waste activists as claimants to science and the authority of experts to judge those claims. We are not arguing that women toxic waste activists pursue their goals merely or solely because, as women, they experience a specific psychological develop- mental path; rather, we suggest that given social and material constraints that largely stem from gender and class, these activists find creative and effective ways to generate change in their communities. These creative forms grow out of a self-articulated ethic of responsibility and connection. In addition to clearly voicing a call to action based on justice, women toxic waste activists give credence to their claims based on a belief in the necessity and importance of caring and a recognition of interdependence. They find the actions of nonresponsive polluters and agencies wrong and requiring redress not simply because these actions violate their rights as citizens and members of a larger polity, but also because these actions violate a moral imperative of caring and responsibility. This ethic of caring over rights is central to the whole toxic waste movement and can be extended by looking at the role of emotions in women's political participation. Taylor (1992) points out that scholars of social movements have failed to examine the importance of emotions. Indeed, the long-dominant resource mobilization theory made it difficult to bring in emotions, by virtue of its reliance on instrumental rationality. Taylor urges us to reconceptualize social movements to "break down the artificial barrier that exists between concepts of organization, rationality, and choice, on the one hand, and affective bonds, emotions, and impulse, on the other." We cannot, Taylor emphasizes, understand why women take up protest activity unless we understand their feelings of anger at male domination; nor can we understand the vitality of women's politics without grasping the nature of what Hochschild terms their "emotion culture," which women use in (1) channeling the emotions tied to women's subordination into emotions conducive to protest; (2) redefining feeling and expression rules that apply to women to reflect more desirable identities or self-conceptions; and (3) advancing an "ethic of care" that promotes organizational structures and strategies consistent with female bond- ing. (Taylor 1992) While Taylor is focusing on specifically feminist organizations, her observations are applicable to women's toxic waste activism. When women claim the responsibility for assessing their assumptions about knowledge, the attention and respect that they might once have awarded to the expert is transformed. They appreciate expertise but back away from designating someone an expert without reservation. Evaluation of experts becomes an impor- tant responsibility that they assume. From Hinds: I had learned early on not to trust officials-we had trouble with them at every level. I try to work within the system, but when there's trouble, I know now how to hold them accountable. With the McKin plans, we were watching them all the time, on issues like the cleanup itself, as well as where the air monitors should go, how many there should be, how often they would be read. We nailed them whenever we saw something wrong. And if they didn't listen, we called a press conference right at the site, and made a big stink. (Garland 1988, 103-4) The two stages that Field Belenky et al. label silence and received knowing are often merged in women toxic waste activists. Although they generally express a perspective characteristic of received knowers, in the particular case of the scientific issues, they more closely resemble silent knowers. Such a perspective is illustrated by a quote from a victim of the Velsicol dumping in Hardemann County, Tennessee: "I took a water sample to the health department; they said nothing's wrong with it. I thought they was good people, smarter than I was. But they wasn't" (Brown and Mikkelsen 1990, 145). Many narratives about women toxic waste activists describe how they were "just plain" housewives at the start who did not have anything to say about toxic contamination or its associated issues. For example, Gibbs relates her initial reaction to a news story about her neighborhood: "The problem didn't affect me, so I wasn't going to do anything about it, and I certainly wasn't going to speak out about it" (1982, 9-10). Subjective knowing, the turn in attention to the inner voice, comes with recognition of the validity of self-determined truths. Gibbs recounts what she was thinking when she tried to start collecting signatures at the very beginning of her activism When I got there, I sat at the kitchen table with my petition in my hand, thinking "Wait, What if people do slam doors in your face? People may think you're crazy." But what's more important-what people think or your child's health? Either you're going to do something or you're going to have to admit you're a coward and not do it. (1982, 13) Hearing an "inner voice" of "self-protection, self-assertion, and self-definition" (Belenky et al. 1986, 54) leads to the beginning of activism. This is the point at which Anne Anderson in Woburn, Massachusetts, Hinds in Gray, and Gibbs in Love Canal began to believe that something was wrong in their communities, despite the denials of local authorities. As Gibbs said, "I used to have alot of faith in officials, especially doctors and experts. Now I was losing that faith-fast!" (1982, 23). Field Belenky et al. state that as women "began to think and to know, they began to act" (1986, 77). Many subjective knowers come to this position as a result of an encounter with "failed authority," usually male. In the lives of many women toxic waste activists, the disillusionment comes from repeated encounters with officials in which their assumptions about the value of human safety over profits or convenience are violated by the officials. Further stages designated by Field Belenky et al. include procedural knowing, a reasoned attempt at resolving the conflicts between external and subjective knowledge, and constructed knowing, which emerges in a voice that integrates the preceding voices of reason, intuition, and expertise of others. Among women toxic waste activists, procedural knowing evolves often out of contacts with a mentor in the role of scientific expert, since these mentors are able to help the activists in learning ways to use scientific expertise for their own goals. Constructed knowing is often focused on an attempt to transcend local issues and address larger concerns. Both Gibbs and Hinds moved beyond their tight-knit communities to work on toxic waste issues at a national level. In Hinds's words, [A young boy] looked at the EPA officials and said, "I don't want to die." That boy, and the loss of my own first baby son, and hearing all the stories of people like us around the country-all that's been a fuel to me. It makes me think that, damn it, this is America, this stuff shouldn't be happening. (Garland 1988, 105)

**The affirmative is a Gynocentric eco-logic that reveals nodes of potential for feminine voices to resist oppression. The phallic logic inherent in scientific thought permeates public policy discussions on nuclear energy production. This gynocentric logic is one that remains open to and respects differences. It is not about essentialists claims concerning women but rather knowledge through the subjective experiences of cultural and historical location.**

 **Glazebrook in 2k5**

(Trish, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, *Ethics & the Environment* 10.2 (2005) 75-99, Gynocentric Eco-logics)

Likewise, I wish to provide a diagnosis and etiology, and suggest a curative possibility for a disease of modernity I will call phallic logic. Symptomatic of this sickness are wide-spread social alienation, global domination and oppression on the basis of gender, race, class and color, and epidemic eco-destruction. A body of critique exists in ecofeminist analyses that experiences these symptoms as a single disease: the phallic logic of modernity. "Logic" in this context does not mean the formal discipline [End Page 75] in which rules for the proper manipulation of abstract statements are laid down. Rather, "logic" in the sense used here is an epistemological term. It means the ways that understanding is structured. Phallic logic is the structure of understanding that permeates patriarchy. This logic takes its paradigm from scientific objectivity, but even voices from within the sciences themselves are arguing that contemporary human being must establish new ways of thinking about nature. I propose that such new eco-logics, that is, ways of thinking about nature, take their guidance from the physical environment. If nature informs knowledge claims, then knowledge itself is construed organically: it is finite and changing rather than fixed and eternal. Such logics can encompass the finitude of physical embodiment as an epistemological principle, and hence I identify them as gynocentric. They are not grounded in the disembodied Cartesian subject that feminists have shown so often and clearly to be typical of androcentric philosophizing. These logics draw instead on the physicality of environmental elements as well as of the thinker, and thus they allow nature's temporality to resonate within knowledge itself. They are not satisfied with a conceptual contrast between nature's on-going coming-to-be and passing-away and the alleged universality of knowledge. Rather, they take nature as a model for truth and acknowledge that nature infuses the things we say to be truth. There is an abundance of arguments for the differences between male and female writing and thinking.[2](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v010/10.2glazebrook.html#FOOT2) I speak in accord with these voices, but I frame my project differently. I will begin by presenting evidence of a call for alternative epistemologies from within the sciences, and then use ecofeminist analyses to argue that the scientists in question are moving away from a phallic logic toward gynocentric eco-logics. Next I will make clear three assumptions that underlie my account. The first two are Heideggerian. I accept his argument that the logic of modernity is scientific objectivity, and I use his account of truth and essence to argue that knowledge is situated rather than universal. Hence gynocentric eco-logics entail an essentialism that is historical rather than biological. I give up biology as the fixative for essence, but avoid a decline into what is entirely arbitrary and subjective by fixing essence in terms of cultural and historical location. Hence I am using a Heideggerian notion of situatedness, but applying it specifically to gender such that I can maintain that the category of "woman" is neither universal, nor shattered irreparably into [End Page 76]fragmented individualism. My Heideggerianism is further qualified in that I am not writing in the spirit of Heidegger's life-time project. I will take the force of his insights to be epistemological rather than metaphysical or ontological, against both his explicit articulation of his project, and the usual preference for metaphysics that pervades the Heideggerian literature. My third assumption is that gynocentric eco-logics are not gender-exclusive. Rather than simply inverting phallic logic, they instead orchestrate an openness to and respect for differences that displace any logic of domination. /////////Thus they make a place for phallic logic, but resist its excessive claim to universality. Analogously, in treating a yeast infection, one does not eliminate the fungus, but returns a balance to the system within healthy parameters. In the last section, I will begin an explication of gynocentric eco-logics by modeling truth organically. I could call my project "alternative epistemology," but I suggest that all epistemologies are alternatives, even phallic logic that claims to be universal.

# 2AC

### AT: Bulter

**Butler locates agency at the site of culture which denies the tenacious realism of sexual difference.**

**Stone 2006** [Allison, *Luce Irigaray and the philosophy of sexual difference*, pp. 54-55]

Since my exposition of the elements of Butler’s theory must be somewhat complicated, an anticipatory summary of my conclusions may help. I will argue that, in each area, Butler does not in fact improve upon Irigaray so decisively as to supersede her later thought. Firstly, Butler ultimately still believes that bodies acquire agency only through being moulded by cultural norms; this view that bodily agency derives from that of culture reproduces the hierarchical privileging of the cultural over the bodily. (Although Butler revises her account of bodies in *Bodies that Matter* to try to solve this problem, the same problem reappears in her revised account.) Secondly, her idea that element of culture undergo constant reinterpretation and change denies the tenacity and unconscious rootedness of ideas of sexual difference, which Irigaray’s account of patriarchal culture, despite its overgeneralization, highlights. Thirdly, Butler’s politics of subversion falls prey to a dilemma: either (as in Gender Trouble) she prove insufficient normative grounds to consider subversion desirable, or (as in recent work such as Precarious Life) she justifies subversion with reference to her theory that bodies are socially formed—but this joins her politics inseparably to her ultimately hierarchical conception of the relation between culture and bodies. I will conclude, in Sections IV and V, that we can revise Butler’s theory of sex and gender to relieve it of these problems, by basing it on a conception of active and multiple bodily forces. This realist revision of Butler’s theory, though, raises a freh question: why should we affirm the existence of natural bodily multiplicity, rather than duality, as Irigaray holds? Finally, Butler’s theory of gender not only fails to surpass Irigaray’s later philosophy, but is also forces our attention back to Irigaray’s later philosophy and onto her deper reasons for postulating natural sexual duality.

#### Gender is not completely socially constructed – butler ignores the subtle interconnectedness of bodily difference and cultural construction which helps Women

Nussbaum 99

[Martha, TheNewRepublic.com, http://www.akad.se/Nussbaum.pdf]

And yet it is much too simple to say that power is all that the body is. We might have had the bodies of birds or dinosaurs or lions, but we do not; and this reality shapes our choices. Culture can shape and reshape some aspects of our bodily existence, but it does not shape all the aspects of it. "In the man burdened by hunger and thirst," as Sextus Empiricus observed long ago, "it is impossible to produce by argument the conviction that he is not so burdened." This is an important fact also for feminism, since women's nutritional needs (and their special needs when pregnant or lactating) are an important feminist topic. Even where sex difference is concerned, it is surely too simple to write it all off as culture; nor should feminists be eager to make such a sweeping gesture. Women who run or play basketball, for example, were right to welcome the demolition of myths about women's athletic performance that were the product of male-dominated assumptions; but they were also right to demand the specialized research on women's bodies that has fostered a better understanding of women's training needs and women's injuries. In short: what feminism needs, and sometimes gets, is a subtle study of the interplay of bodily difference and cultural construction. And Butler's abstract pronouncements, floating high above all matter, give us none of what we need.

### FW

#### 1. Public-Private dichotomy– framework uses masculine standards of objectivity to determine what knowledge is legitimate for public debate pushing unproductive knowledge to the private sphere. Women are forced back into the kitchen and told to keep their pretty-little thoughts to themselves in order for the current system to continue. Extend Culley & Angelique here – masculine politics are failing now and there is only a risk new methods are able to reclaim the public sphere to improve energy production policy. NEGs framework only reinscirbes the public private distinction

**Peterson in 2000**

V. Spike Peterson. “Rereading Public and Private: The Dichotomy that is Not One1” SAIS Review. Vol 20, Num 2. Pp 11-29. Summer-Fall 2000.

 In Homer and Thucydides, **the meanings of public and private are delineated in relation to the demands of war and the moral dilemmas they pose.** In this sense**, their accounts link the state’s external affairs to “impossible” internal dilemmas.** In contrast, the most familiar account of public and private, provided by Aristotle, avoids the question of war and external affairs. Instead of a tragic choice between competing but parallel claims to loyalty, **Aristotle “resolves” the dilemma by privileging the public sphere over the private.** Here, **the public realm of politics constitutes the highest association, a realm of freedom and equality, where citizens pursue the good life. This higher realm depends upon but encompasses the private sphere, which is characterized not by freedom but necessity, and involves not equal but naturally hierarchical relationships.** In this account**, the public sphere of free, equal, reasoning citizens is masculinized by the exclusion of women and feminized characteristics, while the private sphere of contingency, inequality, and emotional attachments is feminized by the relegation of women and characteristics of femininity to it. This is the “model” of public and private most frequently assumed in the Western tradition of social and political theory.** **Arguably its greatest significance is in defining the boundary and elevating the status of “politics”: the dichotomy distinguishes what is deemed political and therefore what is politicized. That which is associated with the private sphere is denied the status of being political, hence, denied the important sense of being contingent** (not given), contestable (not fixed), **and of collective interest** (not simply personal). **Not only do we inherit a bounded domain of citizenship and political power, but we also inherit a subordinated sphere of naturalized inequality.** Or so we assume. What Aristotle intended is the subject of ongoing debate, but he is clear about the interdependence of public and private, which is often lost in modern accounts.14 This interdependence was both emotional and economic. The public sphere depended as much on the cultivation of virtue, love, and emotional attachments15 as it did on the economic productivity of the oikos (household). Hence, on the one hand, Aristotle’s account is more complex and less binary than conventionally assumed. On the other, however, his characterization does establish the hierarchy of public over private (and masculine over feminine), and his avoidance of war and external affairs and omission of (non-oikos) market exchanges introduce differently problematic simplifications.

#### 4. Censorship DA - Framework is the phallic logic that censors feminine voices. There are no net benefits to their framework without first challenging androcentric knowledge production. We refuse to sit down and shut up!

**Mojab 02** (Shahrzad, director of the Women and Gender Studies Institute and an Associate Professor in the Department of Adult Education and Psychology at University of Toronto, Canada; “Information, Censorship, and Gender Relations in Global Capitalism” Information for Social Change 1)

**It is important to know more about the ties that bind censorship to gender.** **Even when one barrier is removed, others emerge to ensure the reproduction of the status quo.** For instance, after decades of struggle, beginning in late nineteenth century, legal barriers to women's access to parliament and political office were removed in the West and, later, in many non-Western states. This was achieved, not simply through access to information, but rather due to women's determination to create knowledge and consciousness, and engage in mobilizing and organizing (sit-ins, demonstrations, picketing, leafleting, singing, etc.) in schools, homes, streets, churches, and university campuses. However, **states and state-centred politics continue to be male-centred.** Even when women have a proportionate participation in the parliament, there is no guarantee that they would all advocate feminist alternatives to an androcentric agenda; and this is the case for the simple reason that women can be as patriarchal in their politics as some men are.A more adequate approach to the understanding of censorship is, I believe, to see it not as an irrational practice, as a mischievous attitude, or a technical problem of obstructing channels of communication. **Censorship is an integral part of the exercise of gender power, class power, and the powers of the nation, ethnicity, religion and governance. Not only does it deny women access to information, but also limits their participation in the creation of knowledge, and denies them the power to utilize knowledge.**If in pre-modern times the church was the major player in creating knowledge, today the market produces, disseminates, and utilizes much of the knowledge, which has achieved the status of a commodity. Knowledge is "intellectual property." Even the knowledge created in public and semi-public institutions such as universities is increasingly geared to the agenda of the market, and serves the promotion of market interests. Moreover, Western states primarily entertain the market as the lifeline of economy, culture and society. They increasingly aim at giving all the power to the market. In dictatorial regimes, however, the state still plays a prominent role in censoring the creation and dissemination of knowledge. From Peru to Turkey, to Iran and to China, **states suppress activists, journalists, libraries, bookstores, print and broadcast media, satellite dishes and the Internet.** They often do so by committing violence against the citizens and the communication systems they use.Although **we may find much gender-based subtlety in the techniques of limiting women's access to information**, I believe that **the subtlest censorship is denying feminist knowledge a visible role in the exercise of power. The state, Western and non-Western, rules through privileging androcentric knowledge as the basis for governance.** The conduct of national censuses, for instance, continues to be based on androcentric worldviews in spite of devastating feminist critique. To give another example, women are now recruited into Western armies in combat functions, but states continue to ignore feminist and pacifist knowledge that challenges the very phenomenon of war and violence (Cynthia Enloe, 2000). Women themselves can be and, often, are part of the problem. In the absence of feminist consciousness, they generally act as participants in the reproduction of patriarchal gender relations. In Islamic societies, when men engage in the "honour" killing of their wives, daughters or sisters, sometimes mothers participate in or tolerate the horrendous crime (Mojab, 2002). The democratisation of gender relations is a conscious intervention in a power structure that is closely interlocked with the powers of the state, class, race, ethnicity, religion and tradition. For both women and men, challenging patriarchy means defying one's own values, worldviews, emotions, and traditions. At the same time, it involves risk taking including, in some situations, loss of life. Women's full access to androcentric knowledge will not disturb the status quo. I argue that, in the absence of feminist consciousness, women may even act as ministers of propaganda and censorship. They will not be in a position to exercise the democratic right to revolt against oppressive rule. In the West, feminist knowledge cannot be suppressed through book-burning, jailing, torture, and assassination. Censorship is conducted, much more effectively, by stigmatizing and marginalising feminist knowledge as "special interest," while androcentrism is promoted as the norm, the canon, and "human nature." That is why, I contend, that if we fill all the media institutions with female managers and staff, if we give all educational institutions to women, or hand over all high-rank military positions to women, the androcentric world order with its violence, war, poverty, and degenerating environment will continue to function. Globalization, as it is understood in mainstream media and in state discourses, is nothing new; it emerged with the rise of capitalism; the main engine of globalization is the capitalist market, and it is promoted and planned by capitalist states through various organs such as the G8, World Bank, European Union, World Trade Organization, International Monetary Fund, etc. The impact of this globalization on women has been largely negative, especially in the developing world. Millions of girls aged 5 to 15 are recruited into the global prostitution market. Millions more leave their families and countries to raise some income as maids. However, other forms of globalization or, rather, internationalization have been in the making. For instance, feminism has evolved as an international movement in spite of the opposition of conservatives in many parts of the world. It has been able to put women's demands on the agenda of states and international organs such as the United Nations. Media are also important actors in globalisation. Women have had more presence in the media both as producers and as targets or sources of entertainment and information programming. There is considerable progress, for instance, in the production of women and feminist press in many developing countries. The Internet and desktop publishing present new opportunities for more media activism. Egypt has a women's television channel. Focusing on the question of censorship, the crucial issue is freedom of speech not only for women but also more significantly, for feminists and feminist knowledge. Feminist knowledge and consciousness is the primary target of censorship. Do the globalizing media allow women of the developing countries to learn about the achievements of Western women in fighting patriarchy? Do women of the West learn from the struggles of women in India, Jamaica or Saudi Arabia? Do the global media allow women everywhere to know about the Beijing Conference and its aftermath? Do they disseminate adequate and accurate information about the World March of Women? My answers are rather in the negative. The cyberspace is much like the realspace that creates it. The fact that many individual women or groups can set up their websites does not change power relations in the realspace. The negative stereotyping of women, for instance, cannot change without the dissemination of feminist consciousness among both men and women. Even if stereotyping is eliminated, gender inequality will persist. **"Gender-based censorship" cannot be overcome as long as gender relations remain unequal and oppressive. It can**, however, **be reduced or made less effective.** While the concept "gender-based censorship" is useful, it should be broadened to include "censorship of feminist knowledge." The following are just a few ideas about what we may do:A) Creating theoretical and empirical knowledge about gender-based censorship, and especially the censorship of feminist knowledge and feminist movements. B) Disseminating this knowledge and awareness among citizens. Using this knowledge for the purpose of dismantling patriarchal power. Knowledge makes a difference when it is put into practice. C) Making this knowledge available to policy makers and integrating it into policy making in the institutions of the market, the state, and non-state and non-market forces. **These goals will not be achieved in the absence of feminist and women's movements.** If censorship **is not a mistake**, but rather it **is** **an organ for exercising gender and class power, resistance to it**, too, **should be a part of the struggle for a democratic regime.**

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### Counter – Advocacies

#### The aff’s activist mothering approach is one that allows for an investigation of intersectional approaches without privileging one over the other

**Ackelsberg 2001** – Professor of Women and Gender Studies at Smith College, PhD in Women and Gender Studies from Princeton University, *(Re)Conceiving Politics? Women's Activism and Democracy in a Time of Retrenchment Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering, Community Work, and the War on Poverty* by Nancy A. Naples; Community Activism and Feminist Politics: Organizing across Race, Class, and Gender by Nancy A. Naples; No Middle Ground: Women and Radical Protest by Kathleen Blee; The Politics of Motherhood: Activist Voices from Left to Right by Alexis Jetter; Annelise Orleck; Diana Taylor; Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroot … Review by: Martha Ackelsberg Feminist Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 391-418

Published by: Feminist Studies, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3178766 .

Nancy A. Naples's Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering, Community Work, and the War on Poverty is a fascinating exploration of the lives and activities of women who were involved in community- based organizations in New York and Philadelphia during the War on Poverty (roughly 1964 to 1974). Her core data are made up of interviews she conducted with approximately sixty of these women and through which she attempted to explore questions such as what motivated them to undertake community work in their neighborhoods; how did race, class, and gender intersect in their political biographies-and their consciousness; how did bureaucratization and professionalization affect their participation; and how did the changing political economy and political culture affect their work (p. 3). From our current political vantage point, when virtually all discourse about social welfare policy focuses on "welfare reform," Naples raises a fascinating question: what

was the role of the state in shaping women's "community work" and/or in creating or expanding arenas for citizenship? The idea that the state might actually create, rather than effectively constrict, opportunities for citizenship offers a refreshing change from contemporary political realities. One of the most valuable aspects of this study, then, is its evocation of a different political-economic moment, when "maximum feasible participation of the poor" rather than "ending welfare as we know it" was the watchword of social policy. Naples explores the impact of that differing policy context on the poor women who were the primary actors at the local level, examining their routes into activism through what she terms "activist mothering," the ways they were changed by their participation, and the ways their participation affected their understandings of themselves as (previously non-) political beings. "Activist mothering," she writes, "highlights the community workers' gendered conceptualization of activism on behalf of their communities. .. . Central to their constructions of 'community' was a convergence of racial-ethnic identification and class affiliation." "Activist mothering," therefore, "includes self-conscious struggles against racism, sexism, and poverty" (p. 114) Being a mother, however, does not automatically generate an oppositional consciousness; in fact, Naples's informants point to a number of different paths into activism, including religious involvement (particularly for Black women and those involved in the Catholic Worker movement), social work, radical politics, participation in other social movements (e.g., the civil rights movement), and Black women's traditions of community caretaking. Interestingly, most of these activists did not identify themselves as "politically engaged" and made a separation between what they understood as their "community work" and what they identified as "politics" (by which they seemed to mean voting, lobbying their elected officials, and so forth). These women saw their community work as simply "a logical extension of their desire to improve the lives of their families and neighbors," what Temma Kaplan originally defined as "female consciousness."' Yet, Naples argues, their "gendered identities as women, daughters, mothers, or workers intersected with racial, ethnic, class, professional, and political identities to create a complex and oftentimes contradictory set of forces that informed their consciousness of inequality as well as motivation to fight for social and economic justice" (p. 181). Many were profoundly changed by their experiences, coming to see themselves as "community workers" and then as empowered citizens, with a right and an obligation to act on behalf of their communities and to make claims against the state. Significantly, Naples attempts to draw lessons from that time for our own. Thus, she notes, "the War on Poverty, with its emphasis on maximum feasible participation, transformed their previously unpaid community work into paid work and, at the same time, empowered them as residents of low-income communities- resulting in a merging of social and political citizenship" (p. 199). Yet, she recognizes the limits of this strategy as well: increasing pressure for professionalization limited the ongoing participation (and influence) of these community workers even in the "heyday" of the War on Poverty. Furthermore, the state that had facilitated politicization and empowerment through its policies could, by cutting back those same programs, limit and virtually eliminate the women's participation. Naples acknowledges the "contradictions of state-sponsored, community-based employment" as a strategy to end poverty, both economic and political. But, she insists, the contemporary move away from income supports and the "fragmentation of social life into discrete policy arenas fails to capture the mutually constitutive relationships between family income, childcare, health care, housing, education, employment, and so forth" (p. 195). Effective social policies to combat poverty must address the interconnections among these problems and must recognize not just women's "double duty" of paid employment and care for household and family, but a third component, as well: "community work." Only when that work is recognized, validated, and compensated, and when women's contributions in that arena are effectively incorporated into our social policies, are we likely to make any real progress toward a more democratic and egalitarian society.8

### AT: Anthro

**Perm do Both - Gender must be the starting point for creating ecological change**

**Mellor, 2000** (Mary, Social Science Professor at Northumbria University and author , “Feminism and Environmental Ethics: A Materialist Perspective”, Ethics and the Environment, 5(1)107-123, ISSN: 1085-6633, accessed via Project Muse)

FEMINISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS An important starting point for the development of an environmental ethics must perforce lie in the experience and situation of women (Gruen 1994). This is, however, not the only starting point. Human society has many other divisions besides gender, but this paper is specifically concerned with a feminist perspective on ethics. The core of my argument, one that has been made many times by feminists, is that women's lives in a gendered society are grounded in the materiality of existence, in the cycles of birth and death and bodily needs (Ruddick 1990). However, in stressing the importance of a feminist analysis to environmental ethics, I would not want women to be seen as the solution to environmental damage and injustice and thereby deflect attention from the problem of male domination and exploitation of women and the natural world (Mellor 1992a, 81). I wish to argue that a solution to the questions of environmental justice and environmental ethics needs to start from an understanding of the social relations underpinning current patterns of unsustainability together with an understanding of the material relations between humanity and nature. This involves a three-fold relationship between human and human and nature and a double dialectic, between human and human (patriarchy, capitalism, racism), and between humanity and nature. This complex relationship requires a breadth and depth of analysis that can integrate an analysis of social relations with ecological relations. In such a context all parts contain active elements. The relationship between humanity and nature is heavily circumscribed by relations between human and human. In turn, the dynamic between humanity and its natural context limits or constrains choices or brings unwelcome consequences. For this reason I would argue that a 'deep' analysis is needed, which I have called deep materialism. This analysis has three starting points, the ecofeminist insight that there is a relationship between the subordination of women and the exploitation of nature, the deep ecologists' argument for a nonanthropocentric ontology and cosmology and the Marxist analysis of the dialectical relations of human material life. The concept of deep materialism combines the adjective adopted by deep ecology and the analytical framework associated with Marx. I would argue that the insights of both are important and there is no necessary conflict between a radical approach to human-human relations and a 'deeper' approach to human-nature relations, although there are tensions between them in practice. The source of these tensions is the priority in different perspectives given to human-nature relations as against human-human relations. A radical approach to ecology such as that of Bookchin (1989) would see a fundamental reorganization of human-human relations as essential to resolving human-nature relations. Deep ecology, on the other hand, would see human-nature relations as the critical element. I would argue that the one is inseparable from the other, human-nature relations require reformulation of human-human relations and vice versa. Ecofeminists would agree with deep ecologists that humanity needs to completely rethink its orientation to the natural world, but like historical materialists would point to the socioeconomic context of such a relation. I would argue that Marx had at the heart of his work the double dialectical framework that I am advocating, but that his later analysis and, more importantly, later interpreters, took a humanist turn that lost the dialectic between humanity and nature. Marx's inability to develop his ideas in a more ecological direction was largely due to his acceptance of the sexual division of labor (Mellor 1992b). Ecofeminists have also criticised deep ecology's tendency to concentrate on the relationship between humanity and nature to the exclusion of the dynamics of intra-human, and particularly gender, relations (Salleh 1992). This leads to a tendency to adopt a de-politicized and even anti-human stance which places the blame for the ecological crisis on an undifferentiated 'humanity.' Ignoring social difference and inequality puts equal responsibility for ecological damage on the North and the South, rich and poor, Black and White, men and women. This is not to imply that deep ecologists do not recognize the existence of what Naess called the relationship between 'man and man' (sic) but that this tends to remain theoretically unexplored. For ecofeminists the question of sex/gender difference/inequality is vitally important given the gendered nature of the relationship between humanity and nature. Discussions of humanity, man, woman, and nature are conceptually problematic. Humanity is divided in countless ways, as are men and women. I would not go along the postmodernist road that claims that there is no extra-discursive category of 'woman' (Riley 1988), but it is easy to slip into universalizing and essentializing frameworks of thought when the words 'man' and 'woman' are used. Equally nature is a deeply problematic concept (Soper 1995). I hope in the course of this paper to make clear the way in which I am using these words. However, to indicate the problematic and divided nature of humanity I will write this word in a broken form, hu(man)ity, in the rest of this essay.

**Aff solves the K - Although non-humans cannot speak for themselves in the traditional rhetorical sense, they still have many modes of nontraditional communication which phallic objectivity denies. Extend our Glazebrook evidence here – Gynocentric approaches are key to challenge dualism between us & them, human & non-human, masculine & feminine. Adopting a gynocentric politics of multiplicity allows a line of communication to be formed.**

**Houde and Bullis, 99 (**Lincoln and Connie, Professor at Southwestern college, professor of communications at the University of Utah, “Ecofeminist Pedagogy: An Exploratory Case”, Ethics & the Environment, Volume 4, Number 2, 1999, pp. 143-174 (Article), accessed via Project Muse)

Language Use within the Logo and Eco-spheres Ecofeminists situate and contextualize language within interconnecting and mutually influencing "logo" and "eco" spheres (Murphy 1991, 1995). Within these inter-locking systems of culture and nature, ecofeminists acknowledge the ways that meaning and identity are constituted in and through discursive and nondiscursive relationships with humans and nonhumans together. Embodied ecofeminist identities are "multiplex" inventions and achievements, always historically contingent and shifting within interrelated and interdependent lifeworlds. Conley (1997) explains that human identity is based on an ecological subjectivity that works "to relate consciousness of the self to that of being attached to and separated from the world" (10). An eco-subjectivity embodies a differential thought process and critical-relational consciousness necessary for transgressing dualistic traps. That is, "an eco-subjectivity that is immanent and in constant becoming...unfolds in a territory, in the subjective experience of time and space. It continues to experiment and by doing so resists hegemony and creates new modes of being" (93). Additionally, this eco-subjectivity is "grounded in an emotional and spiritual conversation with non-human life forms" (Donovan 1990, 375). In other words, this recognition of and relationship with another does not "grant" and "give" voice to animals and nature or anthropomorphize nonhumans, but rather, listens and participates with them as co-participants. As Haraway (1992) observes, "Nature may be speechless, without language, in the human sense; but nature is highly articulate. Discourse is only one process of ar ticulation. An articulated world has an undecidable number of modes and sites wher connection can be made" (324). In and through these webs of differential subject po sitionings and interactions, "nature is made, but not entirely by humans; it is a co-con struction among humans and non-humans" (297). In this case, ecological beings are not ontologized with essentialistic definitions and de-politicized with static and dete ministic discourses. Instead, ecofeminists resist a patriarchal "freezing" of bodies (Haraway 1991, 121) and "metaphysical identity closures" (141) by participating within the processes of knowing and becoming. Rather than an alienation from the self and other, ecofeminists value self-reflexivity and engage with active "voluble" subjects, not "muted" objects (Manes 1992). The failure to affirm multiplicity is characteristic of a colonizing self that does not respect the other as another, but instead absorbs the other into the self (Cheney 1994). "There is no genuine ethics, metaphysics, or politics of difference here, the Other is there certainly, but colonized" (Cheney 1990, 4). Rather than embody an autonomous tech nocratic self or an ecological oneness-sameness, ecofeminists are actively politicizing critical-relational selves. As Plumwood (1993) notes, "Respect for other involves acknowledging their distinctness and difference, and not trying to reduce or assimilate them to the human sphere. We need to acknowledge difference as well as continuit to overcome dualism and to establish noninstrumentalizing relationships with nature where both connection and otherness are the basis for interaction" (174). In this case ecofeminists embrace a contextualist ethic, celebrate a politics of difference, and embody intersubjective interrelationships as differences that make a difference together. This ecofeminist location recognizing continuity and difference is brought into th classroom with popular culture and an eco-cultural politics of identity.3

#### The body politics of the aff comes first – (Read on Condo Bad)

**Saigol in 8**

Rubina; “Militarization, Nation and Gender: Women’s Bodies as Arenas of Violent Conflict” *Deconstructing Sexuality in the Middle East*; p. 175

**It is clear that wherever identity and self are threatened by an Other, an outsider defined as an enemy, women’s bodies become the arena of the most violent forms of conflict. As global conflicts intensify, and males of weak and dependent countries feel threatened by global powers, the notion of women’s bodies as signifiers of nation, home, and honor is likely to increase**. **This increase can** potentially **manifest itself as nationalist anxiety and the response is most likely going to be further incarceration of women**, greater emphasis on the veil and the chardivari, **an enhanced desire to confine women to domestic tasks and motherhood. This is likely to be accompanied by** an intensified glorification of motherhood and **a more urgent need to protect motherhood against violation and impurity, even while increasing women’s participation in the market due to economic imperatives. The double burden is**, therefore, **likely to increase along with the controls imposed on women’s bodies. Women’s bodies will not merely be the site of political, national and armed struggles; they will also become the major signifiers in economic struggles and market conflicts**.

**The 1AC is not an explicit attack on the environment making the K a non-starter – its rights based focus is a key starting point for fostering Human-centered ethics of compassion and care— teaching others through rights also teaching compassionate eco-logics.**

**Hwang 03**

[Kyung-sig Hwang, 2003. Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Seoul National University. “Apology for Environmental Anthropocentrism,” Asian Bioethics in the 21st Century, http://eubios.info/ABC4/abc4304.htm]

The third view, which will be defended here, is that there is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to explain our obligations toward nature, that our moral rights and duties **can satisfactorily be explained in terms of traditional, human-centered ethical theory**.[4] In terms of this view, ecology bears on ethics and morality in that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important effects of man's actions, that much that seemed simply to happen-extinction of species, depletion of resources, pollution, over rapid growth of population, undesirable, harmful, dangerous, and damaging uses of technology and science - is due to human actions that are controllable, preventable, by men and hence such that men can be held accountable for what occurs. Ecology brings out that, often acting from the best motives, however, simply from short-sighted self-interest without regard for others living today and for those yet to be born, brings about very damaging and often irreversible changes in the environment, changes such as the extinction of plant and animal species, destruction of wilderness and valuable natural phenomena such as forests, lakes, rivers, seas. Many reproduce at a rate with which their environment cannot cope, so that damage is done, to and at the same time, those who are born are ill-fed, ill-clad, ill-sheltered, ill-educated. Moralists concerned with the environment have pressed the need for a basic rethinking of the nature of our moral obligations in the light of the knowledge provided by ecology on the basis of personal, social, and species prudence, as well as on general moral grounds in terms of hitherto unrecognized and neglected duties in respect of other people, people now living and persons yet to be born, those of the third world, and those of future generation, and also in respect of preservation of natural species, wilderness, and valuable natural phenomena. Hence we find ecological moralists who adopt this third approach, writing to the effect that concern for our duties entail concern for our environment and the ecosystems it contains. Environmental ethics is concerned with the moral relation that holds between humans and the natural world, the ethical principles governing those relations determine our duties, obligations, and responsibilities with regard to the earth's natural environment and all the animals and plants inhabit it. A **human-centered theory of environmental ethics** holds that our moral duties with respect to the natural world are all **ultimately derived from the duties we owe to one another as human beings**. It is because we should respect the human rights, or should protect and promote the well being of humans, that we must place certain constraints on our treatment of the earth's environment and its non-human habitants.[5]

# 1AR

### Essentialism

**Claims about the nature of gynocentric logic are not rooted in biological determinism but rather the historical and cultural absence of womanhood**

**Glazebrook in 2k5** (Trish, Associate Professor of Philosophy at Dalhousie University in Nova Scotia, *Ethics & the Environment* 10.2 (2005) 75-99, Gynocentric Eco-logics)

I suggest therefore that nature can be eco-logically understood as that which always exceeds interpretation, that which is always more than the account to which it is reduced. Accordingly, scientific and technological interpretations of nature have no epistemological privilege as the final word, as complete understanding, as the "real" truth. They are truths, but not the only ones. Hence their logic is not a tumor that needs to be cut out, but an excessive infestation that needs to cut back to make room for other logics, especially eco-logics that promote wholeness and balance in this epoch of eco-destruction, that make the physical environment relevant to knowledge claims by modeling themselves upon its diversity and inexhaustibility. Science and technology themselves undergo transformation in eco-logics away from their mono-tone of indifferent objectivity and exploitation to cooperative participation in respectful caring for both nature and other logics. Eco-logical science and technology recognize their limits and partiality. Women's historical presence as absence and negation conduces precisely such logics of self-conscious incompletion. Carol Bigwood's analysis is helpful here. She points out that the feminine "has been unable to appear positively in the dualistic framework of metaphysics" (Bigwood 1993, 101) and suspects with Luce Irigaray and Hélène Cixous that this is because female sexuality is multiple rather than binary. Accordingly it is no wonder that the feminine is a gap in the phallocentric account. Women have been thought as not-man, but historically speaking, "masculine" and "effeminate" are oppositional categories, while "masculine" and "feminine" are not. An indication of the displacement of binary difference into multiple differences is evident in feminist analyses not of "woman" but of women. I draw the conclusion from Bigwood's analysis that women's historical (non)appearance as negation and absence is thus two-fold: women have been thought in the Western tradition as lack (for Aristotle, of sufficient body heat to turn blood to semen (Aristotle 1979, 728a18, 766b20; for Freud, of a penis);[9](http://muse.jhu.edu.ezproxy.mnl.umkc.edu/journals/ethics_and_the_environment/v010/10.2glazebrook.html#FOOT9) and also the gynocentric capacity for multiplicity has itself been obscured by the dualisms of phallic [End Page 86] logic. Hence women's withdrawal in the history of metaphysics parallels Heidegger's analysis of the double concealment of being in, truth as (un)concealment, to such an extent that Bigwood's claim that Heidegger's discourse of unconcealment, letting-be, releasement and nearness is "helpful as a way of feminizing so-called Being" (Bigwood 1993, 6) can be made even more strongly. Heidegger's analysis of being is already inherently gynocentric: it resists the normative dualisms of presence/absence, correctness/falsity, one/many. Women are neither one in woman, nor an undifferentiated many, but rather the multiplicity of celebrated differences. As Bigwood puts it, the feminine "is not a representation of women fully transparent to self-consciousness, but always remains immersed in its latency and mysterious life" (31). Women's being is never fully articulable because historically women embrace both absence, and the incompleteness that lies at the heart of any articulation, any (logos), logic of presence. Hence I call eco-logics gynocentric, and in doing so I appeal to **a female essence that is not biologically determined but grounded rather in woman's (un)history and cultural articulation as absence**, hole, negation. Third, then, I draw on Heidegger's account of essence (Wesen) for an essentialism that is historical and cultural rather than biological. As early as The Basic Problems of Phenomenology in 1927, Heidegger argued that "essence" means "productive comportment toward beings" (Heidegger 1982, 110). "Comportment" means the way in which human being directs itself toward things by means of structures of understanding (Kuhn's "paradigms"). It is productive not because the understanding creates the things it knows, but insofar as it determines how things appear, as what they can be understood (science: object; technology: resource). Such comportments depend for Heidegger neither on individual whim nor biology. They take place within and determine an historical epoch and I add, culture. Heidegger argues that the modern epoch is a flowering of a Platonic root. Plato determined "essence" as unchanging, eternal form rather than as the enduring presence things have historically (Heidegger 1959, 72). Hence for Plato, nature is not properly an object of knowledge. His epistemology not only rejects the natural model of organic finitude for knowledge itself, but also excludes the possibility that there can be truths about nature. I suggest that the Platonic move to the eternity and [End Page 87]universality of the idea is the beginning of a domination by and of phallic logic that culminates in modernity. I will read Plato differently below. Here I want simply to borrow from Heidegger the idea that essences are situated and have historical fluidity—like nature, essences (and thus also knowledge concerning them) evolve. What does it mean, for example, to be a woman? Lugones and Spelman have argued convincingly that this question cannot be answered universally for all women (Lugones and Spelman 1993). There is no "woman," only women. In modernity, which I take to be inherently Western, women appear as care-takers, nurturers. In this essence, both biological possibilities and social constructions figure. We have no access to our biology free of social construction, and our social construction has its reproductive under-pinning. Hence to argue that there are gynocentric values of care, multiplicity and diversity, reciprocity and openness to difference, is not to make some claim about the eternal being of the female, but to recognize that women's bodies are political sites that harbor possibilities for balancing the phallic logic of modernity with gynocentric values and practices. I embrace historical gender essentialism as offering the promise of change by means of gynocentric eco-logics.